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In 1999 the EC launched its Sustainability Impact Assessment Programme, which had as its goal 
the integration of sustainability concerns into the development of trade policy.  It was to include 
the development of a methodological framework by the University of Manchester (IDPM) for 
assessing the sustainability impact of trade agreements, while the subsequent studies were to 
inform the negotiations and the dialogue with civil society. The first application of this new 
approach was to be the negotiations being undertaken under the ‘Doha Round’ of the WTO. This 
paper will draw upon this methodology and consider its application in a SIA of the current EPA 
negotiations in the Pacific region of the ACP.  
 
 
Introduction 
In 1999 the EC launched its Sustainability Impact Assessment Programme (SIA), which had as 
its goal the integration of economic, social and environmental considerations into the 
development of its trade policy.  It is an approach that emphasises the long term inter-
generational impact of policy decisions and the active involvement of stake-holders in the 
decision making process. The SIA programme included the development of a methodological 
framework for assessing the sustainability impact of trade agreements, while the subsequent 
studies were to inform the negotiations and the dialogue with civil society. The first application 
of this new approach was to be the negotiations being undertaken under the ‘Doha Round’ of the 
WTO. As part of this process the Institute for Development Policy Management at the University 
of Manchester (IDPM) was contracted by the Commission to develop a methodology for a 
preliminary SIA for the negotiations. Subsequently PricewaterhouseCoopers have been 
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contracted to undertake an SIA of the current Cotonou Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) 
negotiations. These are intended to replace, by 2008, the existing non-reciprocal trade 
concessions given by the EU to the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) group of developing 
countries under the previous Lomé Agreements. 
This paper will draw upon the IDPM methodology and compare it with the approach being taken 
by PricewaterhouseCoopers. It will also attempt to identify those crucial issues which are 
relevant to the Pacific EPA negotiations and their SIA assessment, drawing upon the economic 
impact assessment which has already been prepared by Scollay (2002) for the ACP Secretariat. 
 
The EU’s Economic Partnership Agreements 
Trade relations between the EU and developing countries are governed by three major 
agreements, the General System of Preferences, ‘Everything but Arms’ (EBA) and the Cotonou 
Agreement.  The General System of Preferences (GSP), introduced in 1971, offers non-
reciprocal reductions in MFN tariffs for manufactured goods, ranging from 15% on sensitive 
products to duty free access. A safeguard clause remains allowing for the reintroduction of duties 
should imports threaten serious difficulties for an EU producer and a ‘graduation mechanism’ 
providing for the exclusion of specific country-sector combinations depending upon the 
exporting country’s overall level of industrial development and degree of export specialisation.  
 The EBA agreement is a unilateral non-reciprocal trade concession offering tariff and 
quota free access to the EU market to all low-income developing countries (LDC). Some 
safeguard clauses remain, particularly in regard to rise, sugar and bananas. Since this concession 
is confined to low-income countries it is WTO compatible. 
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 The issue of WTO compatibility (compliance with Article XXIV) was a central issue in 
the renegotiation of the Lomé Conventions, which governed trade and aid relations between the 
EU and the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) group of developing countries. Under the new 
Cotonou Agreement the non-reciprocal Lomé trade preferences are to be replaced by WTO 
compatible Economic Partnership Agreements (EPA) for the middle-income ACP countries by 
2008 when the current WTO waiver expires. WTO compatibility will require the reciprocal 
elimination of barriers on substantially all trade. The precise definition of substantially all trade 
is the subject of considerable debate.  The EU appears to be adopting a definition that covers 
80% to 90% of the value of trade. However the threat of reference to the Disputes Panel may be 
an important political influence in its interpretation and, further, Article XXIV may be subject 
renegotiation during the current WTO trade round. The EPA may cover trade related matters 
including intellectual property rights, standardisation of certification, competition policy, labour 
standards, consumer protection and will include the trade in services. 
 
Regional Trade 
Any discussion of the Pacific EPA (PEPA) must take into account existing regional trade 
agreements. The Pacific Island Countries Trade Agreement (PICTA) commits ten of the island 
states to progressively establishing a free trade area commencing in 2002. Meanwhile the 
Melanesians Spearhead Group – Fiji, Papua New Guinea (PNG), Solomon Islands and Vanuatu 
– are committed to moving to a free trade area by 2008, with the intention of developing a full 
customs union. Nonetheless currently intra-PACP trade is insignificant, at only 2% of total trade. 
Of more significance is the Pacific Agreement on Closer Economic Relations (PACER) between 
the island states and Australia and New Zealand. An agreement on reciprocal free trade with the 
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EU would trigger renegotiation of the PACER. The most likely outcome of such renegotiations 
is for the PACPs to offer similar terms to Australia and New Zealand as those that would be 
extended to the EU. The economic implications of such a reciprocal trade agreement are far more 
significant than the likely impact of concluding an EPA with the EU. Similarly the three Pacific 
US ‘compact’ ACP states – The Federated States of Micronesia, Marshall Islands, Palau – are 
likely to have to provide similar duty-free access for the US. Finally it should be noted that the 
five low income PACPs – Kiribati, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tuvalu, Vanuatu - will qualify for 
non-reciprocal duty free access under the EBA. 
 The EU is currently a minor source for PACP imports; except in the cases of Vanuatu 
(5%) and Samoa (4%) less than 2% of any country’s total imports. By contrast Australia and 
New Zealand dominate imports for all of these countries except the US ‘compact’ countries. 
Exports to the EU are dominated by two PACP states – Fiji (29% of the PACP total: 2000) and 
PNG (66%). In both cases exports are of primary products. For PNG palm oil (31% of the total 
value), coffee (27%) and copper (15%) (Scollay 2002) dominate EU exports, while for Fiji it is 
sugar (92% of the total value). Thus for Fiji the EU’s Sugar Protocol is of particular significance.  
It currently offers a guaranteed market of 165,348 tonnes at the EU’s high internal prices. In 
addition there is an Agreement on Special Preferential Sugar (SPS) until 2006, which provides 
for additional imports of cane sugar from the ACPs and India when a shortfall is predicted in 
supplies to the EU’s cane sugar refineries. The price applicable to SPS sugar is 85% of the 
guaranteed minimum EU price under the Sugar Protocol. Fiji is currently allocated 30,000 tonnes 
(9.3%) of the SPS allocation. Under the EBA duty free access for sugar will be phased in 
between 2006 and 2009 with these quotas counted against SPS allocations. 
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Sustainability Impact Assessments 
In 1999 the EC decided to undertake an SIA to inform their participation in the Doha Round of 
trade negotiations of the WTO. The IDPM was contracted to develop a methodology for the 
various phases of the SIA (see Kirkpatrick, Lee and Morrisey, 1999; Kirkpatrick and Lee, 1999 
& 2002). Although an SIA’s detailed requirements vary with each stage of the assessment 
process and between individual cases, they share common principles. It is these principles, 
outlined in the IDPM’s Phase Three report (2002), that are considered within the context of the 
PEPA negotiations. 
 The IDPM identified four stages when undertaking a full SIA assessment - screening and 
scooping; assessment of proposed measures; assessment of alternative mitigation and 
enhancement measures (M&E) and monitoring and post-evaluation. Here we will consider only 
the first three stages. They recommended that the scheduling of the SIA process should be 
commenced sufficiently early to enable it to allow consultations – both during screening/scoping 
and upon completion - and for it to be taken into account during the trade negotiations. The 
timing of the PSIA may already be a cause for concern, as PWC have yet to publish their 
preliminary studies, while regional negotiations are already commencing. Although the Pacific 
Islands Forum Secretariat were consulted in the formulation of the contract for the SIA there is 
otherwise little awareness of this exercise. 
 Screening and scoping are intended to select and systematise the SIA of each trade 
measure. It should identify the specific aspects of each trade measure and the possible 
negotiation outcomes (‘scenarios’) which should be submitted for assessment. It will need to 
select which country groups or individual countries should be assessed, the time horizons over 
which the impact should be evaluated and identify relevant changes in the broader context of 
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changes in the international trade environment. Finally it will need to specify the sustainability 
indicators to be used, data sources and the methods to be employed. Scoping is likely to employ 
simplified causal chain analysis (CCA) and include preliminary identification of the M&E that 
might later need to be appraised. 
 
Country Grouping 
It is clear from developments that a common ACP-wide EPA, that is the preservation of the 
existing Lomé structure, is not a feasible option. The first question therefore is whether a 
comprehensive PACP EPA is the only option worthy of assessment. Except for the four 
members of the Melanesian Spearhead Group there is no intention to move towards a customs 
union in the region, while the ‘compact’ countries will have particular sensitivities to an EPA 
that might affect the relationship to the US. Indeed a divergence of interest is inevitable in view 
of the differing adjustment costs that an EPA would impose and the benefits that might result. 
Countries differ in the importance of the EU as an export market, in the share of imports from 
the EU, Australia, New Zealand and the US, in the vulnerability of local industries to import 
competition and the level and revenue importance of tariffs. For the five low income PACPs an 
EPA will offer no advantages over the duty-free access they are already guaranteed under the 
EBA. 
Only for Fiji (sugar and tuna) and PNG (tuna and palm oil) is the EU an important export 
market.  Even for Fiji the Sugar Protocol, rather than an EPA, is of prime importance. The future 
value of the Sugar Protocol will be dependent upon the EU guaranteed price, which is likely to 
be reduced under the pressures for CAP reform. Indeed the EC has proposed that the guaranteed 
price should be reduced by 35% from July 2005. At the same time, within the context of the 
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WTO negotiations, there will be pressure on the EU to reduce its sugar export subsidies, which 
will be to the benefit of the Fijian industry selling into the world market, but also to open up the 
EU market to other countries sugar exports, which will not. The whole EU sugar regime itself is 
also under threat. Recently Brazil, Thailand and Australia won a challenge against the EU’s 
sugar export subsidies. Although this differs from the previous banana case, in that it is confined 
to the export subsidies rather than the system of import quotas, it nonetheless increases the 
pressure on the EU to undertake a fundamental reform of its sugar regime. It is also unlikely that 
sugar could be excluded from an EPA as such an agreement would fail to meet the ‘substantially 
all trade’ WTO requirement in the case of Fiji and many other ACPs in other regions e.g. 
Caribbean. 
An SIA focused upon PNG and Fiji, as the largest economies with a particular 
commodity focus and an export orientation towards the EU, appears to be one obvious choice. 
This meets the ‘trade structure’ and ‘vulnerability to changes in trade’ criteria for SIA selection 
recommended by the IDPM. However for a number of other PACPs the EU offers a potential to 
develop their fish exports, with the trade facilitation provisions, which might be offered under an 
EPA, crucial to the future development of this industry. For other PACPs the inclusion of the 
service industries in any EPA may be a major attraction, given the importance of tourism and 
offshore finance. For all PACPs access to the Investment Facility of Cotonou offers potential 
advantages. Finally, access to the French territories in the Pacific might offer high-income 
markets for some countries. Thus a more general SIA for the whole PACP group would be 
expected. The small size of many of the PACPs and their exposure to environmental risk, as well 
as a high incidence of poverty, might suggest individual SIAs, but this is probably an unrealistic 
expectation.  
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However for all the PACPs an EPA will trigger renegotiation of PACER. It is the 
assessment of the outcome of such a renegotiation that will present the greatest challenge to any 
Pacific SIA.  The obvious scenario is to assume the extension of reciprocal free trade to Australia 
and New Zealand, and unlike an EPA with the EU, this will have significant implications for the 
ability of governments to raise revenues through import tariffs, given their dependence upon 
imports from these countries; Tonga, Kiribati, Vanuatu and Tuvalu have a particularly high share 
of tariff revenues in total tax income. It would also impose far more significant structural 
adjustment requirements on some economic sectors, especially manufacturing in PNG and Fiji. 
However such an outcome would minimise the economic welfare losses arising from trade 
diversion. Thus a PACP SIA, perhaps excluding the five low-income PACP members who 
benefit from the non-reciprocal EBA, and assuming the extension of reciprocal free trade to 
Australia and New Zealand, appears a third obvious scenario for consideration. 
Other groupings, based upon ACP sugar producers or small island states, are not only 
likely to present insuperable analytical difficulties, but do not reflect the reality of the regional 
negotiating focus that has emerged. This is reflected in the regional approach, approved by the 
EC, that PWC are taking to their SIAs. However the Pacific Islands Forum, which offers policy 
support to the PACP governments, is advocating an initial negotiating position that involves the 
the ‘opt-in’ groupings suggested by Grnyberg and Unguglo (see Scollay page 68) – a master or 
‘umbrella’ PACP wide agreement, with separate subsidiary agreements to which individual 
PACP’s can then subscribe. The master agreement is intended to set out the principles to govern 
the subsidiary agreements, including dispute settlement procedures, but would be designed so as 
not to require notification to the WTO. The subsidiary agreements would cover services, trade 
facilitation, fisheries, mining, forestry and investment promotion as well as the trade in goods. 
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Thus some PACPs would be able to avoid a commitment to reciprocal free trade, and triggering 
PACER renegotiations, while still subscribing to the overall EPA. This appears at first glance to 
diverge considerably from the EU’s intentions and might represent an unwelcome precedent if 
granted to the PACPs. The question of the degree of divergence and flexibility in regional EPAs 
will be brought into sharp focus by this proposal. For the SIA this issue would need to be quickly 
resolved since such a “pick and mix” EPA would present real problems of analytical complexity 
– effectively requiring individual PACP studies. 
 As well as having to make an assumption about the extension of an EPA to Australia and 
New Zealand under PACER, an SIA will have to make assumptions about the WTO framework. 
A principal concern for the EU, in the light of the Banana Protocol dispute, is that EPAs should 
be WTO compatibility. With the ongoing negotiations for the Doha Round of the WTO the 
question of what ‘compatibility’ will mean is by no means clear. The central issue remains the 
requirement for reciprocity in any trade agreement covering middle-income developing countries 
and the inclusion of ‘substantially all trade’. Changes in the already ambiguous de minimis limits 
would allow the exemption of some products that might minimise the adverse impact of a free 
trade agreement (FTA). At this stage it is probably only feasible to adopt a cautious approach to 
the prospect of radical change in Article XXIV and assume the 80-90% trade coverage 
requirement being adopted by the EU. 
In regard to Fiji, specific assumptions will also need to be made about the future of the 
Sugar Protocol. With the EU market opening to LDCs under the EBA there is some doubt as to 
whether the SPS will be renewed after 2006. The Sugar Protocol itself will need to be the subject 
of ACP wide negotiations (for a detailed discussion of the Sugar Protocol see Scollay Part IV 
(2002)) but may be subsumed in the regional EPAs. The most realistic assumption would 
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probably be of one of unlimited quantitative access to the EU market, but at reduced prices, after 
a ten year transition period. 
 
Areas for Negotiation 
Any SIA will need to identify the significant components of the trade negotiations for analysis. 
For the trade in goods six aspects suggest themselves – products for exemption, imposition of 
labour standards (e.g. in the Fijian garment industry), product standards, environmental standards 
(e.g. ‘dolphin friendly tuna fishing’, sustainability), rules of origin and the time horizon for 
implementation of an EPA. Although the general interpretation of WTO requirements is that the 
implementation of a FTA should be completed over a time period that does not exceed ten years 
and the EU subscribes to this expectation - with all EPA’s commencing in 2008 with a ten-year 
transition period - there have been exceptions (e.g. EU- South Africa agreement). The question 
of the phasing of any tariff reductions will also be a subject of negotiations. However an SIA 
need not confine its assessment to the implementation period, indeed the most significant 
environmental and social impacts are unlikely to be felt in such a short time horizon.  
 Any attempt by the EU to impose environmental and labour standards upon its trading 
partners would be of significance for an SIA that is intended to take account of the broader social 
and environmental impacts of any policy. But such policies may be developing separately from 
the EPA negotiations, instead being of a ‘global’ nature within a WTO context, affecting all of 
the EU’s trading partners. PWC will however need to consider the prospect of their inclusion in 
the EPA negotiations and, if not, likely developments in the broader international trading agenda 
of the EU. Similarly ‘rules of origin’ were identified as one of the outstanding issues that would 
need to be resolved in the EPAs during the Cotonou discussions. It is not clear whether this will 
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be resolved at the ACP or regional level.  This is an aspect that may require a specific sector 
analysis to be drawn upon in the overall SIA.  
 In regard to the trade in services the PACPs are looking for a liberalisation in EU market 
access in those sectors where they have potential, e.g. tourism, and for improved access for ACP 
nationals to the EU labour market (Mode 4).  In an investment agreement they are seeking the 
provisions of investment facilities tailored to their particular needs and which ensures effective 
access to the provisions of the Investment Facility of Cotonou, which has so far proved 
problematic. 
Finally, fisheries offer one of the most important development potentials for the PACP. A 
fisheries agreement must offer benefits in excess of existing multi-lateral and bi-lateral 
agreements. Currently, under Cotonou, tuna exports from Fiji, the Solomon Islands and PNG 
enter the EU with a 24% preference, this will need to be safeguarded. Further the EU is seen as a 
potential market for intermediate quality frozen fish, but this will require trade facilitation 
assistance to meet food safety requirements. A number of issues remain unresolved in regard to 
the rules of origin for fish products – defined by territorial waters rather than EEZ. 
 
Sustainability Indicators 
The IDPM’s suggested a set of core and second tier sustainability indicators is presented in Table 
1. These are intended to be limited in number, but comprehensive in their coverage of the goals 
of sustainable development – economic, social and environmental.  The three target indicators 
are intended to indicate the final impact on sustainable development of any trade measure, 
supplemented by process indicators. The process indicators focus upon key procedures and 
practices which are needed to achieve long run sustainable development – i.e. they assess 
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whether particular measures are consistent with sustainable development principles and whether 
they enhance institutional capacities.  
The choice of indicators, especially the second tier, will depend upon data availability and the 
particular circumstances of countries being studied. In the case of the PACPs the economic 
assessment will need to recognise their shared economic characteristics and the impact an EPA 
might have upon their long-term performance. Thus indicators assessing the degree of economic 
diversification, rates of foreign investment, stock of skilled labour, trends in urban drift 
(migration from outer islands) and in emigration, will all be particularly relevant to the island 
economies of the Pacific.  In addition an EPA will have a particularly significant impact upon 
government revenues, given their high dependence upon import tariffs. An indicator of public 
revenue diversification might therefore also be relevant.  In terms of the social dimension of the 
SIAs it will be important to recognise the differing rural and urban experience in the PACPs; 
with rural sector measures of income per capita, education and health provision. Similarly for a 
number of the ACP states, such as Fiji, ethnic indicators of the incidence of poverty (e.g. income, 
employment) will be essential. Finally environmental indicators will need to include measures of 
water quality, pollution and sustainability of natural resources, especially tropical forests and 
fisheries. 
 The significance of changes in any indicator will depend upon the extent of existing 
social, economic or environmental stress, the direction of change, the magnitude of the change, 
the geographic extent of any impact, reversibility, and finally, the regulatory or institutional 
capacity to implement offsetting M & E measures.  
Table 1 : Sustainability Indicators (Adapted from Table 4 IDPM (2002) 
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Indicator  Core  Second Tier 
Economic Real Income 
Fixed Capital Formation 
Employment 
Savings, consumption 
Components 
Self/informal employment 
Social Poverty 
Health & education 
 
Equity 
Income 
Life expectancy, mortality rates, nutrition, literacy 
rates, enrolments. 
Income distribution by gender, ethnic group 
Environment Biodiversity 
Quality 
Natural resource stocks 
Eco-systems, endangered species 
Air, water, land 
Energy resources, non-renewable resources 
Process Consistency with 
Sustainable development 
Institutional capacity 
Polluter pays 
 
Sustainability mainstreamed, ‘ownership’ and 
political commitment 
 
The Second and Third Stages 
In the second and third stages of an SIA place greater emphasis upon the assessment of the 
separate components within each measure, as well as employing more rigorous analysis 
including quantitative modelling. Causal chain analysis will be used to trace the major causal 
links between each trade measure and establish their eventual sustainability impact. Second tier 
and process indicators will be considered and SIA’s applied to contrasting countries within the 
broad country group being studied.  The EPA scenarios that might be considered in the PACP 
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context include complete reciprocal free trade, exclusion of the five LDCs and US ‘compact’ 
countries from the EPA, groups of PACPs for whom particular sector agreements might be 
significant (e.g. fisheries, tourism), extension of the FTA to Australia and New Zealand, reform 
of the Sugar Protocol, with the phased removal of quotas but reduction in the EU internal price 
and the fall back scenario of the GSP. The introduction of mitigating and enhancement (M&E) 
measures will introduce a new range of possible scenarios. 
It is upon M&E measures that the stage three analysis focuses. M&Es can include 
agreements nesting within broader international trade agreements (e.g. WTO), trade-related 
measures that can form part of the EPA, measures to promote technical cooperation, capacity 
building, trade facilitation and the measures by national governments (i.e. structural reform, 
infrastructure investment, education and training, social policies).  
 EU support for the Convention for the Conservation Management of Highly Migratory 
Fish Stocks in the Western Central Pacific Ocean (‘Tuna Commission’) may be an important 
M&E measure for the fishing industry, especially as the EU has indicated that it wishes to be a 
full member.  It has already provided €21 m. since 1975 under the Regional Indicative 
Programme to support the Forum Fisheries Agency, which supports PACP member’s 
participation in the Tuna Commission and the development of a sustainable industry. 
 Since the Cotonou Agreement specifically emphasises that it is aimed  “at enhancing the 
production, supply and trading capacity of ACP countries as well as their capacity to attract 
investment” (Article 34.3), trade facilitation measures should be a central issue. Trade 
facilitation will include technical assistance and funding to meet EU sanitary and phytosanitary 
requirements and measures to assist in market development. Widely defined, these measures 
would offer the potential to overcome many of the adverse consequences of adopting an EPA 
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and therefore will be of considerable significance in any SIA. Although the EU has indicated that 
the overall level of financial assistance to the ACPs must be within the envelope provided under 
the European Development Funds of the Cotonou Agreement, this includes a substantial 
Investment Facility for private sector development, which offers considerable potential for 
funding trade facilitation measures. For example, should the PACPs chose to include services 
(especially tourism) or fisheries in the EPA negotiations then the potential for additional training 
support and market development, through the National (NIP) and Regional Indicative 
Programmes (RIP), and investment funding through the Investment Facility, will be crucial in an 
SIA. 
Similarly the level of EU aid will be important in offsetting the government revenue loss 
from the reduction in tariffs that would be required should the FTA be extended to Australia and 
New Zealand. Tonga, Kiribati, Vanuatu and Tuvalu are all particularly vulnerable to reductions 
in tariff income. As long as the substantially all trade requirement is fulfilled some products will 
be able to retain tariffs. Samoa, the Cook Islands and PNG are already pursuing a programme of 
tariff reduction with substitution of VAT and excise duties, while FSM and Tonga are 
considering a major restructuring of their tax systems. Nonetheless taxation reform is likely to 
present one of the major challenges to the PACPs in adopting FTA’s with their major trading 
partners. In Fiji, for example, there is political opposition to tariff reductions and in the Marshall 
Islands to the introduction of consumption taxes. Meanwhile in Vanuatu there is opposition from 
elements in the financial services sector to the broadening of the tax base. The SIA will therefore 
need to make assumptions about the success of governments in achieving revenue substitution 
and the extent of EU transitional support.  Any reductions in government revenue would need to 
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be offset by reductions in public expenditure and this may be of considerable significance in 
estimating the social impact of adopting the EPA/PACER in the medium-term. 
Estimations of the economic and social impact will also be faced with the difficulty of 
anticipating the outcome of structural adjustment within particular sectors.  In the case of Fiji 
major restructuring of the sugar industry will be required if the industry is to be internationally 
competitive. Currently the refusal of the indigenous Fijians, who communally own the land, to 
renew the leases of the indo-Fijian tenant framers, is reducing production. Issues of land reform 
are thus as central as quality control and investment in securing the long-term future of the 
industry. Meanwhile the Fijian garment industry, which in 1999 employed 17,000 with exports 
of US$ 200 m., has guaranteed access to the Australian market for another seven years under 
SPARTEC. However there are signs of the transfer of production and the loss of market share as 
a result of the phasing out of quotas under the MFA. As both sectors employed particularly 
vulnerable groups, indo-Fijians in the case of sugar and women in the case of garment 
manufacture, employment reduction in these sectors may have a significant impact upon poverty.  
Thus the social ‘baseline scenario’ is particularly problematic in the case Fiji. 
The criteria for assessing M&E measures will include their cost-effectiveness, their 
feasibility in terms of the existing institutional capacity for their effective implementation and 
their contribution to achieving the sustainability objectives. Applying these criteria the SIA 
should identify a set of ‘best’ M&E measures whose impact upon the core economic, social 
environment indicators could then be assessed.  The sensitivity of the choice of the M&E 
measures can be assessed by substituting some of the ‘next best’ M&E options. However 
assessment needs, appropriate assessment methods, and sufficient good quality data, will have to 
be reconciled with the resource constraints of the SIA. 
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 We can therefore identify a number of crucial issues on which any Pacific SIA will have 
to focus. It will have to consider the impact of the extension of the EPA to Australia and New 
Zealand, the possible inclusion of services (especially tourism) and fisheries, the extent of trade 
facilitation measures, the enhancement of investment through the Investment Facility of Cotonou 
and the overall level of EU NIP and RIP aid. It will have to consider the wider context of EU-
ACP trade arrangements, in particular the possibility of a ‘two tier’ approach to EPA 
negotiations, with the establishment of uniform principles to be applied across all regional EPAs, 
and the future of the Sugar Protocol. 
 
PricewaterhouseCoopers 
Three further questions remain.  Firstly, the methodological approach of PWC to the issues that 
have been reviewed. Secondly, the influences upon the choices that are made in considering 
alternative scenarios - i.e. who is setting the agenda, who has ‘ownership’? Finally what 
influence, if any, has the SIA process upon the course of EPA negotiations. 
 PCW (2003) explicitly acknowledge that they are following the IDPM methodology. 
They identify six broad areas that may be subject to negotiations under the EPAs – trade in 
goods/market access (e.g. import duties, quotas, safeguards, rules-of-origin, trade facilitation, 
agriculture, fisheries); investment; general trade-related areas (i.e. competition policy, 
intellectual property rights, standardisation, labour standards, consumer health, environment); 
specific trade-related areas (i.e. investment protection, public procurement) and legal issues 
(dispute settlement). In selecting the issues to be assessed they have adopted three criteria – core 
components of Cotonou, areas subject to early negotiations and those identified, a priori, to have 
potential important sustainability impacts. Three broad regional groupings have initially been 
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chosen based upon the Caribbean, Africa and Pacific.  In phase 1 in-depth regional SIA’s are 
being undertaken for West Africa and the Caribbean, as well as a preliminary overall ACP 
assessment. 
Indicators will be selected, on a case-by-case basis, from a broad list of economic, social 
and environmental measures. The social indicators include access to basic services, economic 
opportunities (drawing upon the Poverty Reduction Strategy agenda), social safety nets 
(including food security), migration, gender equality, HIV/AIDS and group vulnerability to 
economic and social shocks.  The environmental indicators (air and water quality, land and 
biodiversity) draw upon the approach of the OECD (2000). In addition to the usual economic 
indicators a particular emphasis is placed upon assessing the informal sector, in view of its 
significance in many ACP countries and its impact upon government revenues. Indicators are 
grouped under three headings. Firstly, ‘activity based indicators’ – means of production, 
activities and policies that may be affected by the EPAs (e.g. spending on schools). Secondly, 
‘results based indicators’ – assessing the impact of the EPA in the areas identified (e.g. school 
enrolment). Finally ‘impact indicators’ - the long-term global indicators to which result based 
indicators contribute, but which may be affected by other variables (e.g. literacy rates). 
Four ‘conditioning factors’ are identified as providing the context of the EPA 
negotiations. Firstly existing trade agreements, particularly the future of the EU’s Commodity 
Protocols and the WTO trade round.  Secondly, the economic context of the ACP states, both 
macro and micro, and including the impact of corruption. Thirdly, EU policies, particularly CAP 
reform. Finally, the situation of the least developed countries i.e. the EBA.  
Again PWC follow the IDPM in their criteria for identifying M&E measures –  impact, 
cost-effectiveness and flexibility.  In addition they will be considering enforcement ability, 
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transparency, equity, policy compatibility and political acceptability. M&E measures can both be 
trade related and general, and implemented over both the short and long-term. 
The criteria for the choice of alternative scenarios will be determined by the available 
data and modelling techniques, issues that are “inspired by the context of the negotiations”, and 
issues which may have an impact upon the broader development objectives of the EU-ACP 
partnership. Five possible scenarios are suggested for economic modelling at the ACP level – the 
phasing out of the Commodity Protocols, zero tariffs, EU enlargement, CAP reform and possibly 
the impact of the WTO trade round. “It should be noted that the scenarios have not been chosen 
for their likelihood nor because the consortium considered them as options for the negotiations” 
however…“these details scenarios will be discussed with Commission and might also be made 
available for stakeholder input”. The lack of disaggregated data is likely to prevent such 
economic modelling at the regional level. 
In their final Phase One report (2004) PWC indicate the focus that has emerged from 
their first regional studies of West Africa and the Caribbean. Of the economic sectors agriculture 
emerges as of particular importance given its dominance in many ACPs (e.g. 85% of the 
population are employed in subsistence agriculture in PNG and 66% in Tonga). It is a sector that 
presents major potential environmental problems and is important in its social impact through the 
predominance of small scale framers.  The opportunities for diversification will be a crucial 
aspect to evaluate in any SIA. 
 In considering trade influenced economic changes PWC identify, amongst others, 
impacts upon traditional commodities that employ large numbers of the population (e.g. sugar), 
changes that increase migration (i.e. outer island depopulation), activities that occur near 
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coastlines (e.g. infrastructure development) and impacts upon food security (e.g. decling fish 
stocks) – all of which are of particular relevance to the PACP situation. 
 They also emphasised the potential for regional integration; this may involve 
consideration of the sub-groupings for any SIA as already discussed. Secondly, the opportunities 
for horizontal diversification; the potential to reduce dependence upon a particular economic 
activity is a central issue in assessing the impact of trade changes that may challenge such 
traditional activities. Thus the social and economic impact of the phasing out of the Sugar 
Protocol will depend not only upon the ability of the industry to restructure to become more 
competitive, but also upon the alternative employment opportunities or social support available 
to the displaced sugar framers. Similarly the environmental impact will depend upon the harms 
and benefits from the traditional activities compared with those offered by the new. 
In the case of the PACPS the development of the fishing and tourism industries must be a 
particular focus for assessing environmental impact. At the same time the constraints upon 
diversification (e.g. transport infrastructure, marketing, research and development) will need to 
be considered. Similarly, the potential for vertical integration (e.g. fish processing). This may be 
encouraged by asymmetrical and ‘back-loaded’ tariff reductions in the EPA, providing medium 
term ‘infant industry’ support. 
 PWC also consider the importance of investment (primarily through public-private- 
partnerships for infrastructure); the need to address technical standards as an obstacle to trade 
through technical assistance and Mutual Recognition Agreements and the liberalisation of 
services, including issues of technology/management transfer.  
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NGO Critique 
Turning to the issues of the ‘ownership’ and influence of the SIAs, although the NGOs 
welcomed the principle of the adoption of SIA by the EU they have become increasingly critical 
of its employment in practice (NGO 2003). They have found very little evidence of it influencing 
trade negotiations at the WTO nor in the formulation of mitigating and enhancement policies. In 
particular they have criticised the assumption that increased trade liberalisation must be desirable 
and welfare enhancing. They argue that the “no liberalisation of trade in different forms” 
scenarios is excluded from SIA assessments “closing off alternative policy options and 
undermining the purpose of the tool”.  However the existing trade regime provides the baseline 
case for most SIA studies, thus only a scenario of increased trade restrictions are likely to be 
excluded from the assessment.  
More tellingly they observe that it is the Commission that has determined the alternative 
scenarios to be evaluated and that these usually reflect its predetermined focus. The response that 
other interested parties may undertake their own analysis is dismissed, as other stakeholders will 
not have the resources available, nor are such studies likely to be as influential with the 
Commission if it does not have ‘ownership’.  This does raise the central issue of the purpose of 
EU funded SIAs – are these technical studies to support the Commission’s negotiating process, 
objective assessments to be employed by all parties to the negotiations or public relations 
exercises to support the EC’s position in a wider stake-holder environment? Since the NGOs also 
see little evidence of the SIAs so far undertaken actually influencing the process of policy 
formulation, including at the Member State level, current evidence might suggest the latter. 
The NGOs also criticise the emphasise upon adjustment on the part of the LDC trading 
partners without addressing the need for change in the EU’s  “damaging trade distorting 
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policies”. In EU terms this represents a call for ‘coherence’ in EU policies but it fails to give 
sufficient acknowledgement to the continuing pressure for CAP reform, both from a number of 
EU Member States and as part of the current WTO trade round. Indeed this has become a central 
issue in stalling the round. 
Finally they emphasise the importance of ensuring that mitigating and enhancement 
measures are delivered. In the context of the ACP EPAs there is a significant advantage in that 
the Cotonou aid mechanism clearly provides such a potential mechanism, although the existence 
of the institutional framework alone is no guarantee.  
 
Conclusion 
PWC are clearly following the “Manchester” SIA framework and many of the issues they have 
isolated from their ACP and regional studies correctly identify aspects relevant to the PACPs. 
The existing social impact assessments being undertaken as part of PICTA, and the economic 
assessments already commissioned by the PIF, such as that by Scollay, provide a basis upon 
which a more comprehensive SIA could be constructed. 
 However some fundamental questions remain unanswered. Firstly, how are the alternate 
scenarios to be selected? The existing Lomè trade agreement provides the ‘base scenario’, 
although this cannot continue beyond 2008. The ‘notional agreement scenarios’ – the most likely 
outcomes of the negotiations – are much more problematic. Although a reciprocal WTO- 
compatible EPA is the most probable, it will be complicated by the M&E measures and the 
possibility of a master/subsidiary agreement. The opening of EPA negotiations before the 
commencement of the SIA may clarify some of these issues. In particular how far is a ‘two-tier’ 
EPA structure going to emerge i.e. will a uniform ACP-wide structure (emphasising consistency) 
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be negotiated, within which regional EPAs will be constructed? The employment of a centralised 
Brussels team for the negotiations will enhance the EC’s ability to pursue such a strategy if it so 
chooses. Alternatively will each region be allowed substantial flexibility to develop an EPA 
responsive to it own particular circumstances and needs? In the case of the PACPs this is being 
expressed most forcefully in the proposal, advocated by the PIF, for a master/subsidiary ‘pick 
and mix’ EPA and this has not been dismissed by the EC in the initial negotiations.  
At the same time the WTO context remains unresolved and yet WTO compatibility is the 
prime requirement for the EC in the EPA negotiations. The ongoing Doha Round may answer 
such questions as the definition of ‘substantially all trade’ and ‘special and differential treatment’ 
for the developing countries. 
While answers to these questions will provide a clearer focus for the SIA, there is the 
further substantial complication of the triggering of PACER. An SIA that fails to consider the 
implications of the extension of a matching FTA to Australia and New Zealand would be 
fundamentally flawed. 
Finally there remains the question of the ‘ownership’ of the SIA. PWC acknowledge that 
the purpose of an SIA is to “increase transparency by developing a basis for discussion with 
European and ACP stakeholders about sustainability implications associated with the 
negotiations”. 
PWC’s Phase II Inception Report (2004b) in itself answers few of these questions. PWC 
have decided to undertake an SIA confined to the fishing industry for the Pacific region, 
accompanied by a focus upon tourism in the Caribbean and agro-industry for West Africa. 
Although reiterating the scenario selection criteria – trade significance and a priori sustainability 
impact – the reason for the selection of fisheries for the Pacific remains unclear. It does not 
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appear to be a product of significant consultation in the Pacific region as this is to be undertaken 
in the current Phase II. Whether this selection reflects the established interest of the EU in the 
potential development of this industry, including access for EU fleets, or the EU’s long-term 
support for the sustainable management of the industry, as evidenced by financial support for the 
Forum Fisheries Agency under the Regional Indicative Programme, also remains uncertain. 
Although the sector assessments will inform the SIA methodology it is difficult to see how these 
studies alone will provide the basis for the wider regional SIAs. Even a specific regional sector 
SIA may be of limited relevance to other regions. But above all it raises again the question of 
‘ownership’ of the process and whether the SIA will be usefully employed, either by the 
Commission or the PACPs, in the forthcoming negotiations. 
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